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Introduction 
Francis Fukuyama is always worth reading. Whether one agrees with his ideas or not, 
Fukuyama is a discourse setter: what he says helps to shape the academic and political 
agenda. Fukuyama’s succinct book, State Building: Governance and World Order in the 
Twenty-first Century, is no exception: it is worth reading, and it openly tries to set a political-
cum-academic agenda.1 Does it fully succeed? Maybe not. However, Fukuyama’s symbolic 
power to state the order of things – to set the boundaries of the questions we ask, to tell us 
where to look for our answers, and to direct political decision making – makes it all the more 
important to indicate how and why that is the case. 
Tersely put, Fukuyama wants to tell us that states are important, and that many of 
today’s problems, from AIDS treatment to terrorism, can in fact be driven back to failed state 
building and inefficient governance. This is a clear departure from the all-too-simplistic 
notion of “minimal states” that ruled the development debate until about the middle of the 
1990s. Hence we must find out how to build states and how to spread efficient governance: 
that is Fukuyama’s road to World Order. 
Below, we will summarize Fukuyama’s contribution and explore the limits of his 
arguments. However, a traditional summary is challenging: Fukuyama tries to bring together 
research traditions in political science, political/historical sociology, International Relations, 
and, perhaps most importantly, “New Institutional Economics” (NIE). Moreover, Fukuyama 
also links his theoretical lessons to a wide range of case studies and real-world political 
scenarios, from (failed) state-building in Eastern Europe to the when and how of military 
intervention in sovereign states (e.g., Bosnia, Iraq). To put it mildly, State Building is a book 
with a very wide scope – and, to borrow, Fukuyama’s own vocabulary, too much scope may 
limit the strength. Fukuyama essentially tries to “ground” and expand political science and IR 
with insights from NIE. As we will see, doubts remain concerning the theoretical framework 
proposed. Many links between theory and a series of substantive claims are left unarticulated, 
raising the possibility that the book’s policy recommendations are unwarranted. 
Fukuyama’s Argument 
As we learn in the Preface of the 2004 hardcover edition, State Building is an outgrowth of a 
series of lectures delivered by Fukuyama at various institutions. The main body of the text is 
divided into three chapters; while a very short fourth chapter presents the book’s concluding 
message. 
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Chapter 1, “The Missing Dimensions of Stateness”, takes its cue from the debate 
about the role of the state in economic development circles the NIE literature. It introduces an 
important distinction between the scope and strength of states. On the one hand, scope relates 
to the extent of functions that the state carries out. These are located on a spectrum that 
ranges from minimal scope (e.g., public good supply, property right definition and 
enforcement, and macroeconomic stabilization) to intermediate scope (e.g., internalization of 
externalities, environmental policy, and education) to more far-reaching functions (e.g., 
industrial policy and he redistribution of wealth). On the other hand, strength relates to the 
power that states have to implement functions that fall within the scope of their activities: it 
reflects the institutional capacity to act in specific ways. Fukuyama’s thesis is that conflating 
these two dimensions causes confusion and muddled policy prescriptions. For Fukuyama (p. 
30), the question is “how do we get to Denmark?” where Denmark represents a developed 
county with well-functioning state institutions. 2
Building on the distinction between the scope and strength of a state, Fukuyama says 
that to understand state capacity we should also address the question of the supply and 
demand of institutions. The supply question is composed of four aspects “(1) organizational 
design and management, (2) political system design, (3) basis of legitimization, and (4) 
cultural and structural factors” (p. 31). Fukuyama argues that, of the four aspects, the first 
(organizational design and management) is the easiest to transfer; it comprises knowledge can 
be expressed formally3. The respective transferability of the second, third and fourth aspects 
are “medium”, “medium to low”, and “low”;  they are embedded in ways of knowing that are 
difficult to formalize, and hence to transfer. 
The question of demand for institutions, succinctly put, refers to the “fact” that if 
there is not sufficient domestic demand for a well-organized state (that is to say, for a state 
that comes to combine low-scope with high-strength) then it is unlikely that there will be 
successful state-building (pp. 47-8). But in “the absence of strong domestic demand, demand 
for institutions must be generated externally. This can come from one of two sources. The 
first consists of the various conditions attached to structural adjustment, program, and project 
lending by external aid agencies, donors, or lenders. The second is the direct exercise of 
political power by outside authorities that have claimed the mantle of sovereignty in failed, 
collapsed, or occupied states” (p. 48). Therefore, it is not impossible, says Fukuyama, to 
successfully build states through power politics – at least to some extent. As we shall see, 
Fukuyama tries to make such a claim more precise in Chapter 3, albeit it in way that might 
fail to convince. 
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Chapter 2, “Weak States and the Black Hole of Public Administration”, contains, in 
our view, Fukuyama’s most interesting contribution. In this chapter Fukuyama points out 
that, even though formal knowledge about administration and organizational design can be 
transferred, this does not mean that it is possible to engineer a perfect organization – either in 
private or public contexts. On this account, he is critical of most dominant economic 
approaches to the study of organization, because they often overlook informal institutions, 
such as organizational culture, that enable delegated judgment to make a difference. Indeed, 
Fukuyama complains that economics has a tendency to frame most problems of organization 
in optimization terms. To make his case, he proceeds by reviewing two of the dominant 
approaches in the economics of organization, namely, principal-agent and transaction-cost 
theories. Since he perceives delegated discretion as the central organizational problem, his 
primary focus is on principal agent issues, and in particular with incentive alignment or 
shirking obviation. This does not mean that Fukuyama entirely ignores transaction cost 
considerations, however. 
In a dynamic environment, that is, one characterized by the emergence of new 
problems and hence in need of continuous organizational adjustment, there are essentially 
three, essentially cognitive, reasons that render the design of an optimal organization 
impossible: (1) many organizational goals cannot always be well-defined; (2) monitoring is 
not a panacea; and (3) there is no fixed rule of thumb for the extent of delegation. Let us 
briefly take each in turn. 
(1) If individuals have limited rationality in Herbert Simon’s well-known sense4, then 
it is not plausible to assume that goals are unambiguous, and hence can be put in the form of 
an optimal control problem. Organizational problems are not as mechanical as price theory 
implies. In fact, rather than flowing from top-down, most organizational knowledge is 
distributed, specialized and sticky. As such, it is not necessarily amenable to formalization. 
Many organizational problems are solved by organizationally embedded knowledge that is 
revealed in the reflexive process of adapting to changing circumstances – for example, in the 
face of innovation or exogenous competitive pressures. 
(2) The incentive problem is not just typical of private organizations but also of public 
ones. Incentive-alignment, as known, is “solved” by monitoring output since it is impossible 
to monitor input – i.e., work effort – in every point in time. Therefore, incentive schemes – 
“optimal wage contracts” – are functions of observable and quantifiable output. 
But it may also be difficult, Fukuyama specifies, to monitor output. Modifying the 
working paper version of what eventually became Pritchett and Woolcock5 with the 
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categories introduced by Israel6, he accordingly qualifies that public sector services can be 
distinguished according to transaction intensity and specificity. Transaction intensity “refers 
to the number of decisions that need to be made by organizations, which range from very 
small (e.g., decisions to change interest rates at a central bank) to very large (taking deposits 
in a retail banking system, or delivering primary education)” (pp. 75-6). Specificity is instead 
“the ability to monitor a service output.” A “highly specific service is jet aircraft 
maintenance, a complex skill that is hard to fake. If a mechanic is incompetent, there will be 
immediate consequences. By contrast, high school guidance counseling is a service with very 
low specificity. The counselor may advise a student to change career directions; the advice 
may not be taken immediately, and, even if it is, its impact on the student’s later life may not 
be known for years (if at all, since measurement requires a counterfactual comparison)” (p. 
76). In short, a low specificity output is difficult to measure; a high specificity output is less 
so.7 Does this mean that for developing countries informal institutions are the solution to the 
poor performing formal ones when it comes to activities with low specificity and high 
transaction volume? Unfortunately, the answer is not so simple, because the matter hinges on 
the maturity of the social capital, not on social capital as such.8
(3) The problem of the extent of discretion to be delegated to organizational 
constituents is the last cognitive problem that constrains our ability to engineer optimal 
organizations. Such problem exists not only in private but also in public organizational 
contexts, e.g., fiscal federalism (pp. 97 ff.).9 Theoretically, here Fukuyama refers especially 
to the path-breaking contribution of Friedrich A. von Hayek.10 Extending some of the insights 
of his mentor Ludwig von Mises about bureaucracy and socialism, Hayek argued that 
economic central control of planned economy is impossible: no individual possesses all the 
relevant knowledge. Indeed, to be solved, many problems require “the knowledge of the 
particular circumstances of time and place”.11 So, knowledge is not only dispersed, but also 
idiosyncratic or, following Michael Polanyi,12 tacit. This necessarily implies that even though 
in some cases centralized governance may have advantages (e.g., managing technological 
innovation) some tasks must be delegated through some level of decentralization. And this 
leads, of course, to the problem of optimal amount of discretion. The optimal amount of 
discretion, moreover, is itself particular to time and place (pp. 99-101). 
In Chapter 3, “Weak States and International Legitimacy”, Fukuyama relates the 
problem of weak states to the international level, asserting that “weak governance 
undermines the principle of sovereignty on which the post-Westphalian international order 
was built” (p. 129). Yet, the answers given by this chapter to the weak governance question at 
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the international level move outside the preceding discussions. Fukuyama tries to link the 
normative debate concerning military intervention (when should states intervene, when is it 
legitimate to violate state sovereignty, what is to be considered a “threat”, who decides, and is 
the US right to go it alone in the absence of adequate international institutions?) to the very 
different question concerning the building-up of efficient institutions. The conclusions 
reached as to the questions of international legitimacy, democracy, and sovereignty (and the 
different approaches to state building held by the US and Europe) must therefore be seen as 
considerations not having much bearing on the theoretical discussions laid out in the first two 
chapters. 
What we think Fukuyama wants to offer in this Chapter, which to some extent does 
follow from the previous discussion, is actually a word of caution. He indeed distinguishes 
between different phases of state building, and suggests that it is only within the first phase – 
post-conflict reconstruction – that we can reasonably expect to achieve something. He is in 
fact rather skeptical as concerns the task of creating self-sustaining public institutions from 
the outside. Rather than proposing new solutions for endogenizing institutional demand, 
Fukuyama basically proposes that we should lower our expectations because “we do not … 
know how to transfer institutional capacity in a hurry” (p. 141). 
Discussion of Fukuyama’s Approach 
Overall, we find interesting Fukuyama’s attempt to introduce contemporary institutional and 
organizational economic theory into the realpolitik discourse. At the same time, we feel that 
there are some empirical and theoretical issues that need elaboration. Let us mention three of 
those issues. The first two must be regarded as missing links, whereas the third regards the 
expansion of theoretical horizons. 
First, Fukuyama is certainly correct that we need to think constructively about how to 
build states and how to export suitable institutions. Both are pertinent issues on the political 
scene. Forms of state building are of general concern because state/governance problems spill 
over into the international community. Moreover, as Fukuyama also makes clear, we still 
need better recipes concerning the different forms of international intervention in “sovereign 
states” like Serbia and Afghanistan. Evidently, individual state governance and “world order” 
are interconnected. 
Yet there is less recognition of the more embedded ways in which state institutions 
originated, from the very outset, not just in a national but also in an international context. 
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Fukuyama addresses this link from a perspective reminiscent of popular political discourse. 
In other words, Fukuyama links the national and international levels thematically (failed state 
building in one corner of the world affects the rest of the world) and normatively (trying to 
set up some guidelines for when the international community can and should intervene in 
state affairs), but does not do so theoretically. This prevents us from recognizing that states 
formed and reformed within an interstate system of political and economic competition as 
well.13 This national and international notion of power politics ties in not just with institution 
building per se, but with the dynamics of institution building. If states developed also as 
responses to their position within an interstate system of competition one may equally look at 
this very concretively in the world today. For instance, it is often not a serious option for 
political leaders in developing countries to mobilize their citizenry in order to strengthen the 
state, as happened historically in France and England. Weak states find other ways of 
adapting to the situation: they remain weak, but channel a portion of the resources they may 
carve out to ruling families or other elites (or, in the extreme, to one individual: the dictator). 
These elites have little or no incentive to create so-called modern states, for that would just 
destabilize their own power position.14 The only “efficiency” criterion they will abide – if 
rational – is to assure that the degree of institutional stability offered matches the amount of 
rent extraction requested.15
Fukuyama is certainly right that state governance does play an important role in 
guiding political and economic development. But in his eagerness to “bring the state back in,” 
he conceptualizes states as closed analytical units that interact with the international level 
only when they mismanage their internal affairs. This leads Fukuyama to diagnose a series of 
problems as if their solution were to be found in better management programs of the single 
polities. However, to bring back in the state does not mean to return to a Hobbesian notion of 
the state. Whatever the merits, the globalization debate has served to alert social scientists to 
the many ways in which states are constrained by exogenous forces, and to the variety of 
non-state actors, local and transnational, that also shape governance.16 Surprisingly, 
Fukuyama manages to bypass the whole globalization debate, even if he sees his own work as 
a contribution to that debate. 
Second, one further – and arguably even more pertinent – question has to be raised, 
for Fukuyama surprisingly does not do it: what is the relationship between so-called 
enforcement and legitimate rule? Or, alternatively posed, what is the relationship between 
state enforcement and democracy? This is a crucial problem, especially because Fukuyama is 
clearly trying to offer “intervention guidelines”: when should we intervene, and what do we 
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do once we are “in”. Whereas the current Bush-doctrine wishes to establish international 
security by spreading democracy, Fukuyama wants to do it by spreading efficient 
governance. Does that amount to be saying the same thing with different words? Fukuyama 
never really provides an answer. In Chapter 2, for instance, Fukuyama indicates that the two 
levels of efficiency and legitimacy work together. Legitimate forms of state governance, in 
the long run, are also the most fruitful ones. That is a very optimistic way to think about it. 
But, more substantively, it is also a very questionable way to think about, for again it does not 
follow automatically from the empirical data: which kind of developing countries have done 
well economically over the past 50 years, the more or the less democratic ones? And is there 
a relationship at all? No matter which definition of democracy one follows, a state like Saudi 
Arabia would probably score high on the enforcement scale, but low on the democracy one. 
The simple fact is not only that it is genuinely possible to create high levels of enforcement 
through non-democratic methods, but also that it might in fact be cheaper. Relatedly, the 
success stories of South-East Asian countries do not seem to support Fukuyama’s thesis 
either: so-called miraculous growth was established without much attention paid to 
“democracy”. 
Third, and referring now to the more theoretical foundations of State Building, it 
should be underlined that some of Fukuyama’s theoretical points are not, as he claims, 
entirely forgotten in economics. As we saw, he basically turns to the NIE for the theoretical 
foundations of his argument. However, much of the NIE sources that he refers to are, at their 
analytical hard core, actually not too different from the (neoclassical) economic theories that 
he tries to criticize. The NIE is a useful portmanteau that contains a lot of hidden information: 
not all NIE theories are the same. The NIE contains approaches that are not only (more) 
neoclassical but also better known.17 Yet the NIE also contains (arguably less-known) 
approaches that, much like Fukuyama, explicitly see cognitive limitations as central.18
Fundamentally, the cognitive limitation approach of the NIE sees learning rather than 
allocation as central. As a result, it entails a more informed type of comparative institutional 
analysis. In the evaluations of (known) feasible governance alternatives we should keep in 
mind two criteria. The first is the ability of alternative governance structures to limit 
deadweight losses from rent seeking, soft budget constraints, indivisibilities in team 
production, asset specificity and the like. This is the criterion that has also predominantly 
filtered into other disciplines and that Fukuyama obliquely takes issue with but by to a large 
extent drawing on the same NIE sources that use it. The second criterion regards the other 
side of the coin: the ability of alternative governance structures to generate benefits 
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impossible to achieve otherwise (such as quasirents and technological innovation in the case 
of private contexts and economic growth and development in public ones). The cognitive NIE 
approach is theoretically trying to assert the crucial role played by both criteria: the ability to 
internalize negative externalities as well as the ability to create positive externalities.19 Had 
Fukuyama looked into this other literature, his analytical model of institution building and 
institution transferability would have resulted more convincing. 
From Philosophy of History to Efficient State Management? 
Having reported and discussed the distilled essence of Fukuyama’s approach, let us finally 
contextualize the argument by reading it against Fukuyama’s authorship, for indeed it seems 
to us that Fukuyama has walked an interesting trail in his approach to political issues. This 
trail can be spelled out. It also seems to us that Fukuyama’s argument would force him to 
reconsider the philosophical framework contained in his earlier work. At root, we feel that 
Fukuyama will have to tackle more openly the tension that exists between universality and 
embeddedness. 
In a certain sense, State Building should be seen as a continuation of Fukuyama’s 
controversial “The End of History?”20, and this despite the fact that the two works stand apart 
in both style and content. On the wave of the fall of the Eastern bloc, Fukuyama claimed in 
this article – and reasserted more fully in a derived, bestselling book, the End of History and 
the Last Man21 – that the final universal structure for the governance of human affairs had 
been achieved: the market economy and (Western) liberal democracy. Following Hegel’s 
footsteps, Fukuyama made a universal claim: the final governance structure concerned the 
human race as such. And if the final governance structure had not yet been achieved 
everywhere, it was only a question of time until it did, for the entire world was subject to the 
same forces of history. 
In State Building Fukuyama is motivated by a far more pragmatic question: how do 
countries actually reach the final governance structure? That is, how do we in fact build states 
that allow for both liberal values and economic prosperity? This motivational question is, in 
the final analysis, the corridor within which Fukuyama constrains his new, nonphilosophical 
journey. And the itinerary followed within the corridor is “whether the institutions and values 
of the liberal West are indeed universal” – and hence, if not yet achieved in all countries, can 
actually be transferred to all countries – “or whether they represent, as Samuel Huntington 
(1996) would argue, merely the outgrowth of cultural habits of a certain part of the Northern 
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European world” (p. 3).22 The answer to this question, we have learned, is tantamount to 
answering the following two others at the level of economic organization theory: (1) what is a 
well-organized state?, and (2) how do we build one? And the answers to these two questions, 
Fukuyama underscores, have important implications for both development and world order. 
So, in State Building Fukuyama tries to paint a much more complex picture than in 
“The End of History?”. In this picture, informal institutions (cultural values, customs, mores, 
norms, etc.) can alter the way in which formal institutions (most notably the legal order) and 
organizations (most notably the state) function (or not). Because of the nonnegligible role 
played by informal institutions, there are, Fukuyama now implies, serious obstacles to 
exporting institutions and organizations. This is so because, crudely put, embeddedness limits 
universality. Furthermore, Fukuyama points out that we are taxed by severe cognitive 
limitations that constrain capacity to achieve the best institutional and organizational 
solutions.23
Whereas Fukuyama earlier postulated that we had reached the final governance 
structure, he is now asking how such a structure is reached (and can be created and 
maintained) at efficient cost. Contrary to the previous philosophical perspective this involves, 
it seems, an implicit recognition that there are no Hegelian forces or world Geist that 
automatically push the world in this or that direction: it is up to us to shape the world in ways 
that we deem to be superior. In this way, Fukuyama’s trail is indeed indicative of the general 
development we have seen over the last 15 years: from a renewed Wilsonian Liberal 
optimism that characterized the early 1990s, to the much more realist and pragmatic approach 
that dominates today. It is evident to everyone by now that a “New World Order” did not 
emerge by some hidden force of history, just because Communism collapsed. Nor did Liberal 
institutions simply settle everywhere. Suddenly, there is a realization that we know very little 
about how to build and spread “institutions for good governance”. Fukuyama’s contribution 
has shaped the sense that people make of complex issues: we have learned a way of knowing 
a little more. 
Hence, despite a series of shortcomings, Fukuyama has inspired a fascinating debate, 
especially in the field of development theory and foreign policy. And the debate should be 
especially informed by the contemporary theory of economic organization – which owes 
much to the New Institutional Economics. 
We welcome this debate as we welcome the coalition of interdisciplinary scholarship. 
Everybody talks about it, but Fukuyama has tried to do something about it. While 
Fukuyama’s conception of state building, as the conduit of power in a new World Order, 
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might be contested, he has charted the contours of fresh conceptual thinking; at the very least, 
there is something robust to contest. Supporters and critics are afforded scope to forge a new 
agenda. We hope that they will meet the challenge. 
 
Notes and References 
                                                 
1 The book was first published as a hardcover edition in 2004. The new 2005 paperback edition contains two 
prefaces: the 2004 original, and one that relates Fukuyama’s arguments to the ongoing Iraq crisis.With the 
exception of the prefaces, the pages match in both editions. 
2 Although ideal types are, of course, abstracted from empirical reality, the choice of Denmark does not seem to 
be entirely congruent with Fukuyama’s thesis. “Denmark” may indeed be used (and has been used, e.g., L. 
Pritchett and M. Woolcock, ‘Solutions when the Solution is the Problem: Arraying the Disarray in 
Development’, World Development 32(2), February 2004, pp. 191-212) as an ideal type of the kind of state that 
resembles Weberian rule-bound bureaucracy. But “Denmark” most certainly cannot be taken as a state that has 
achieved what Fukuyama is after, namely, reduced scope and appropriate enforcement. By any measure, 
Denmark is one of the states in the world with the largest scope. The state is, literally, everywhere. (We feel 
entitled to say this, as one of the authors of this paper is from what is called “Denmark”.) Even the present 
government, which proclaimed repeatedly in the 1990s that it would cut down the state sector – Danish Prime 
Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, even wrote a book in 1993 called From Social State to Minimal State (Fra 
Socialstat til Minimalstat), when he was still in opposition – has effectively increased the number of state 
employees. Perhaps Fukuyama should have found himself a better metaphor. But which, if not Denmark? The 
point may be nothing but trivial insofar as it may be taken to cause problems for Fukuyama’s model-to-be-
copied of a reduced but empowered state as the way forward for developing countries: if history is anything to 
go by, the success examples of countries like Taiwan or South Korea indicate a road forward that leaves much 
more space for authoritarian state intervention (scope and enforcement) than Fukuyama would like to concede. 
3 Our impression is that by “formal knowledge” Fukuyama means what some organizational economists call 
“blueprint knowledge”. Compare for example R. N. Langlois and N. J. Foss, ‘Capabilities and Governance: The 
Rebirth of Production in the Theory of Economic Organization’, Kyklos 52(2), 1999, pp. 201-18. 
4 Which should actually be thought of as a form of “limited cognition”. See Ch. 10 by R. N. Langlois in R. N. 
Langlois (ed.) Economics as a Process: Essays in the New Institutional Economics, Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 1986. 
5 Pritchett and Woolcock, op. cit. 
6 A. Israel, Institutional Development: Incentives to Performance, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 
1987. 
7 These categories will prove confusing to many organizational scholars, for in Williamson’s framework (see O. 
E. Williamson, ‘Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives’, 
Administrative Science Quarterly 36(2), June 1991, pp. 269-96) asset specificity refers to the nonfungibility of 
an asset. A highly specific asset is one with low or no fungibility. As such, it can lead to opportunistic behavior 
and a tussle for quasirents, which can only be solved through vertical integration. 
8 “Workers … can and do behave with a high degree of professionalism in developing countries, but their 
primary ties remain very strong, and the countervailing effects of socialization into the norms of the various 
professions is weaker, just as other forms of human capital are less developed. This reduces the possibilities for 
substituting social capital for formal monitoring and accountability, making the performance of low specificity 
tasks less efficient. Those non-Western countries that have developed the most rapidly were the ones in East 
Asia that already had highly developed norms of professionalism in public service before they modernized” (p. 
90). 
9 Incidentally, there’s an emerging economic literature (called Second Generation theory of fiscal federalism) 
that focuses exclusively on fiscal federalism from an organizational viewpoint that, though germane, cannot be 
discussed here. See, among others, W. E. Oates, ‘Toward a Second-generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism’, 
 10
                                                                                                                                                        
International Tax and Public Finance 12(4), August 2005, pp. 349-73; G. Garzarelli, ‘Cognition, Incentives, 
and Public Governance: Laboratory Federalism from the Organizational Viewpoint’, Public Finance Review, 
34(3), May 2006, pp. 235-257. 
10 F. A. von Hayek, ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’, American Economic Review 35(4), September 1945, 
pp. 519-30. 
11 Ibid. p. 521. 
12 M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-critical Philosophy. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1958. 
13 See, for example, sociologists like J. Baechler, The Origins of Capitalism (translation by B. Cooper of Les 
Origines du Capitalisme, Gallimard, Paris, 1971), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1975; Ch. Tilly, The Formation of 
National States in Western Europe, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975; or economic historians such as 
E. Jones, The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia 
(third edition), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, esp. Ch. 6. 
14 For example, oil-producing countries, the main income of which is based on (Ricardian) rents deriving from 
their “resource trap” position, will normally lack incentives toward participatory state building. 
15 Compare, e.g., D. North, Structure and Change in Economic History, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., New 
York, 1981, Ch. 10 and M. Olson, ‘Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development’, American Political Science 
Review 87(3), September 1993, pp. 567-76. For a more recent characterization of these delicate political-
economic equilibria that view state organization and the development process as indissoluble, see R. Bates, A. 
Greif, and S. Singh, ‘Organizing Violence’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(5), October 2002, pp. 599-628. 
16 See, for example, B. Thomassen, ‘Fidelity and Betrayal in Trieste: Locating the “Crisis of the State”’, in Th. 
M. Wilson and H. Donnan (eds.) Culture and Power at the Edges of the State, Lit Verlag, Münster, 2005, pp. 
31-55. 
17 See, for example, North, op. cit.; Th. Eggertson, Economic Behavior and Institutions, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1990; Williamson, op. cit. 
18 See, among others, Langlois (ed.), op. cit.; Langlois and Foss, op. cit.; L. Kim and R. R. Nelson (eds.), 
Technology, Learning, and Innovation: Experiences of Newly Industrialized Economies, Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 2000; R. R. Nelson and B. N. Sampat, ‘Making Sense of Institutions as a Factor Shaping 
Economic Performance’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 44(1), January 2001, pp. 31-54; Yu, 
T. ‘The Role of Government in the Economic Development of the East Asian Learning Economies’, Journal of 
Public Finance and Public Choice 20(1), 2002, pp. 23-41. 
19 Langlois and Foss op. cit.; Garzarelli op. cit. 
20 F. Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, The National Interest, 16, Summer 1989, pp. 3-18. 
21 F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, The Free Press, New York, 1992. 
22 In S. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, New York, 
1996, we were offered a competing meta-narrative to that of Fukuyama’s End of History. The world had not 
settled into any final form: huge differences in values not only persisted, but would grow stronger over time, and 
this would lead to a clash of civilizations. Hence, Huntington argued that the values Fukuyama had seen as 
reaching their final destination were mostly Western, and was very skeptical about their diffusion. Lately, 
Huntington has moved in the opposite direction. In a Preface to a recent book co-edited with Harrison (called, 
appropriately, Culture Matters), Huntington for example argues that we can (and should) spread Western values 
(see L. E. Harrison and S. Huntington (eds.), Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, Basic 
Books, New York, 2000, pp. xiii-xvi). Exogenous development strategies, Huntington argues, can work hand in 
hand with endogenous ones and make people “think the right way”. This value or cultural level is exactly the 
level that Fukuyama, as we saw, deems to be impossible to spread. Hence, Fukuyama has become less 
“universalistic” and Huntington more so: on that account they seem to have moved towards each other. 
However, as they meet, they still seem to disagree: Huntington believes that values can be transferred after all 
(e.g., religion is not such an eternal constant as he led us to believe in Clash of Civilizations); Fukuyama instead 
believes that what can in fact be transferred is found within the more narrow field of organizational design, and 
partly institutional design.  
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23 In a very concrete sense, of course, embeddedness and limited cognition are actually the same problem. See 
especially A. O. Hirschmann, ‘Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, Destructive, or Feeble?’, 
Journal of Economic Literature, 20(4), December 1982, pp. 1463-84. 
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